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Abstract                 
This study aims to explain the association between corporate 
governance and earnings management by emphasizing the four 
main theories underlying corporate governance.  Main focus of 
the paper is to take corporate governance practices as a 
monitoring mechanism to prevent opportunistic type of 
earnings management practices. While exhibiting substantial 
review from the world literature, the study provides an insight 
to the Turkish corporate governance awareness. 
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Özet 
Bu çalışmanın amacı,  kurumsal yönetimin temelini oluşturan 
başlıca dört teori üzerinde yoğunlaşarak kurumsal yönetim ve 
kâr yönetimi arasında bulunan ilişkiyi açıklamaktır. Bu 
çalışmanın ana odağı, fırsatçı tipteki kâr yönetimi yönelimlerini 
önlemek için kurumsal yönetim uygulamalarını bir denetleme 
mekanizması olarak ele almaktır. Bu araştırma, aynı zamanda 
da gelişmekte olan Türkiye örneğinde kurumsal yönetim 
farkındalığına ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktır. 
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1. Introduction 
Essential objective of financial accounting is to provide relevant and reliable 
information to related users for making important decisions (Williams et al., 2002). 
However, while making decisions, conflicts may arise between the users of 
accounting information and the interests of the firm. Both the users and the firm aim 
to maximize their benefits by manipulating accounting information to favor 
themselves by increasing or lowering earnings for the firm and mostly increasing 
only for individuals. 
Managers may practice earnings management to release some useful, private and 
superior information to the public they know about the firm’s performance. If this is 
the case, then earnings management is efficient and may not be harmful to 
stockholders and the public in general. On the other hand, financial scandals that 
shocked the accounting world like Enron, WorldCom, Tyco etc. have all created a 
public sensitivity that earnings management is used opportunistically by firm 
managers on behalf of their own self-contained benefits rather than for the benefits 
of the stockholders (Jiraporn et al., 2008). 
In Turkey, earnings management turned out to be a topic of increased interest for 
financial regulators right after the 2001 economic crisis. The crisis put forward the 
significance of reliability in accounting information. Many investors in different 
levels had experienced big losses, and capital markets came under question. 
Accordingly, new regulations come into charge to assure faithful representation and 
establish accurate pricing in the market (CMB, 2003). To overcome earnings 
management, corporate governance practices have been improved and more 
dependency has been allocated to independent/external auditors. Primary objective 
of corporate governance is to act like a monitoring system, so is to solve agency 
conflicts by supporting management’s interests with shareholders, while 
diminishing the management’s aptitude to manage earnings (Xie et al., 2003). 
The notion of earnings management is vitally important in Turkey, even though it is 
not broadly discussed within the scope of the literature. In this context, this study 
aims to enlighten the association between corporate governance and earnings 
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management by taking a closer look at the four main theories and to elevate the level 
of awareness of accounting for the users in Turkey. 
2. Literature Review 
In order to make an attempt to explain the association between corporate 
governance and earnings management, clear definitions of these two concepts are 
needed.  Additionally, the four main theories underlying corporate governance, 
which are agency, signaling, stakeholder, and institutional theory require attention 
in order to incorporate the philosophy of corporate governance with earnings 
management. 
2.1. Corporate Governance 
“Our knowledge of what we know about the efficacy of corporate governance 
mechanisms is rivaled by what we do not know” (Daily et al., 2003). 
Cadbury Committee (Cadbury, 1992) defines corporate governance as ‘‘the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled”.  Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) as an international organization containing 34 
countries with the sole objective of encouraging economic development and world 
trade, defines corporate governance as: 
“The system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the 
board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance” (OECD, 
2004). 
Furthermore, there is another well-known definition for corporate governance, 
which states corporate governance as “a set of mechanisms through which outside 
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders” (La Porta et al., 
2000). While corporate governance can be defined as the system that directs and 
controls the business activities with the management, it clarifies rules, practices, and 
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procedures to distribute rights and responsibilities for the managers, board and 
other stakeholders in the name of making the correct and reliable decisions (Gulzar 
and Wang, 2011).  Corporate governance is beyond just a system; rather a 
monitoring mechanism embedded into a philosophy, which protects firms and 
expands the investor trust and confidence. It safeguards the stakeholders from 
fraud, cheating, mismanagement, dishonesty, and offenses. An underlying investors’ 
concern about corporate governance is its potential impact on value creation 
(Cormier et al., 2010).   Moreover, corporate governance provides transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, and reliability. It comprises of laws, procedures, routes, 
customs and instruments that influence the style a company is managed or directed 
(OECD, 2004). 
2.2. Earnings Management 
Accounting manipulation ranges over a number of methods like earnings 
management, income smoothing, big bath accounting, aggressive accounting, and 
simply fraud. Above-mentioned methods - except for fraud - are the results of 
loopholes within the scope of the accounting standards.   Managers or other insiders 
practice earnings management to deceive stakeholders or to affect contractual 
outcomes by making adjustments through reported earnings. Good corporate 
governance structure can prevent earnings manipulation and turns earnings 
management into more reliable and informative tool (Gulzar and Wang, 2011). 
It is fair to state that earnings management is very different than fraud. At the same 
time, it includes fraud, purposeful violations of local generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), and accounting choices within GAAP that mask true economic 
performance and the volatility of earning (Pergola and Joseph, 2011).  It concerns 
the selection of estimates and accounting techniques. Earnings management lies 
between the boundaries of legal framework and any firm that practice earnings 
management can be demonstrated within the borders of accepted accounting 
manipulation (Rashidah and Fairuzana, 2006). 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that there is only a thin line between earnings 
management and fraud. Thus, there is a broad array of earnings management tricks 
 Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 2/2 (2016) 115-127 
 
119 
 
and they cannot always be easily revealed and classified. There is a scale that 
changes from precise conservative accounting and absolute legitimacy to fraud. 
However, aggressive accounting choices make it difficult to distinguish between 
opportunistic behavior of earnings management and the legitimate practice of 
accounting discretion without classifying the managerial motivations to manipulate 
earnings.   One thing is clear that earnings management is an intentional action. It 
takes in any kind of manipulation that may influence financial reporting over 
earnings or any other related accounts under legal framework of accepted 
principles. This manipulation can be practiced to meet the objectives of 
opportunistic or efficient behavior of earnings management.   The practice of 
managing earnings makes investors and shareholders to have distorted judgments 
about the company since the performance of the company does not reveal the true 
results. Therefore, good corporate governance structure together with effective 
board monitoring is essential to reduce the occurrence of earnings manipulation 
when motivations for such manipulations are high.  Equally, Chtourou et al., (2001) 
have found that the board size and competence are negatively associated with 
earnings management.   
2.3. Corporate Governance and Earning Management 
The literature reviews the theoretical framework with four main theories to explain 
and analyze the association between earnings management and corporate 
governance. These theories are agency theory, signaling theory, stewardship theory 
and institutional theory.  Directly involved with the above mentioned theories, 
ownership structure is a critical issue as well which is an internal control 
mechanism that focuses on the aspects that define the ownership of the company 
and refers to the manner in which titles or rights of representation redistribute the 
capital of the company in one or more individuals or legal entities. The monitoring 
power derived from the ownership structure results in the type of control exercised 
over the company and particularly, over the top management team (Gonzalez and 
Garcia-Meca, 2014).  
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 2.4. Agency Theory 
The essential point in agency theory is that the agents will generally be interested in 
their personal wealth and try to increase their personal gains rather than 
maximizing the shareholders’ value, which finally will facilitate earnings 
management. The theory offers unique insight into information systems, outcome 
uncertainty, incentives, and risk in addition to the fact that it is an empirically valid 
perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989). The chasing of personal interests upsurges costs to 
the firm. These costs include monitoring and controlling costs and losses due to 
wrong decisions made by the managers. The outcomes of this opportunistic 
behavior eventually will be reflected in the firm’s earnings (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  Subsequently, agents have a motivation to manage reported earnings so as 
to meet earnings targets and therefore, to get performance related payment or 
bonuses that are related to the firm’s earnings. This situation generates an 
information asymmetry as managers practice the discretion they hold on accruals, 
which alternately decreases the reliability together with the relevance of reported 
earnings and the entire financial statements.  
2.5. Signaling Theory  
The main purpose for signaling theory is to give explanation for certain accounting 
practices. It provides an opportunity to integrate an interactive theory of symbolic 
communication and social benefit with materialist theories of individual strategic 
action and adaptation (Bliege and Smith, 2005).  The theory assumes that 
accounting numbers need to be verified as an unaffected tool by signaling investors 
to better understand the firm’s actual value. The researchers who used signaling 
theory as a hypothesis revealed that there is an information asymmetry among 
agents and investors. In this regard, earnings management can be seen as a useful 
tool, since it enables communication of private information with investors so that 
they can shape their long-term decisions and have valid opinions about the firm’s 
strategies within the legal framework of law. Moreover, at the center of this theory, 
manipulated accounting numbers are instruments to signaling. Investors get the 
signal as much as firm allows them to better understand the firm’s value and create 
stock portfolio in the best manner (Habbash, 2010). 
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2.6. Stakeholder Theory  
Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of the organization objectives”.  The main groups of 
stakeholders are the customers, employees, local communities, suppliers and 
distributors, and the shareholders.  In addition these, Friedman (2006) includes the 
media, the public in general, business partners, future generations, past generations, 
academics, competitors, NGOs, activists, trade unions, financiers other than 
stockholders such as debt holders, bondholders and creditors in general, 
competitors, the government, regulators, and the policymakers.  
Stakeholder theory describes companies as multilateral agreements between the 
business and its various stakeholders. The association between the business and its 
internal stakeholders; like managers or employees, is outlined by formal and 
informal laws and rules occurred in the course of time of the relationship. Although 
management might get finance from shareholders, they are based on employees to 
achieve the productive aim of the company.  
According to the theory, external stakeholders, such as suppliers, community and 
customers, are also bordered by formal and informal laws and rules. The theory can 
be perceived as an extension of agency theory, which assumes board of directors to 
care for the interests of shareholders. The association between stakeholder theory 
and earnings management is that management might manage earnings so as to 
improve their personal gains through the expense of the stakeholders (Freeman, 
2010). 
2.7. Institutional Theory  
According to institutional theory, companies are tied to rules together with 
regulations, which they must obey so as to safeguard their legitimacy and therefore, 
have access to resources and guarantee their survival. However, the frame that is 
composed of rules and regulations do not automatically assure that the business will 
efficiently continue its operations. The center of this theory goes with the aim that 
corporate governance should declare that a company is associated to an 
environment by stating its goals, which must create harmony with the 
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environmental expectations. Therefore, corporate governance should define the 
goals of the company as part of an existing value system inside the company 
(Habbash, 2010). 
Good governance embraces effective monitoring. Effective monitoring can be 
effected by two important characteristics. First one is the size of the board. Board 
size is related with the performance of any firm. Smaller boards are thought as more 
effective and present better firm performance, since they can make strategic 
decisions and have strong communication with less conflict. The second is to have 
independent non-executive members on the board. They are thought as 
independent monitoring mechanism. Thus, they can reduce agency problems and 
improve firm performance (Saleh et al., 2005).   
3. Corporate Governance in Turkey  
According to Capital Markets Board of Turkey, board of directors is the highest 
administrative body, which makes strategic and executive-level decisions for the 
firm. The major aim of the board is to increase the market value of the firm to its 
maximum level. Moreover, the board should guarantee that shareholders get steady 
income and should uphold the balance between the shareholders’ interest and 
growth of the company, in order to avoid agency problems.  
Board members must not announce confidential or inside information to the public 
or other parties and they must not use information for their interest. Within the 
framework of corporate governance principles, board of directors is liable for 
achieving firm’s goals in the most transparent behavior (CMB, 2003).   
Corporate governance principles for Turkey directs board members to be efficient, 
independent when making decisions, free of any influence and conflicts, since these 
characteristics form the success and performance level of the firm. Furthermore, 
board should have independent non-executive members. They are expected to be 
objective, free from bias, and act equally when making decisions. In order to apply 
good corporate governance practices, the majority of the board members should be 
independent.  However in Turkey, board of directors should have at least two 
independent non-executive members and one third of the members should fulfill the 
 Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 2/2 (2016) 115-127 
 
123 
 
criteria for independence (CMB, 2003).   
The OECD has directly influenced Turkey as far as corporate governance is 
concerned. Capital Markets Board of Turkey has fully embraced these principles.  In 
hope to encourage the implementation of the principles, in 2004, Capital Market 
Board of Turkey promulgated that the BIST companies would be liable for 
publishing a Corporate Governance Compliance Report along with their annual 
reports. The Report allowed companies to explain their compliance levels consistent 
with the comply or explain approach adopted by the Capital Markets Board of 
Turkey.  Shortly after, in 2007, BIST has established a Corporate Governance Index 
(XKURY) based on the compliance levels of BIST companies to measure their 
profitability and income performances (Karacar and Muştu, 2014). 
Turkey as a developing country with an emerging capital market and an economy 
should emphasize the significance of corporate governance.  There are debates over 
the level of corporate governance among the Turkish listed firms where a portion of 
the academia and regulators believe that the level of corporate governance is strong 
enough.  On the other hand, a greater portion believes that these firms are directed 
with weak corporate governance structures in general, meaning that there is a weak 
investor protection and minority rights. Moreover, nepotism acts as a major 
constraint for the Turkish firms with pyramidal and high family-orientated 
ownership structure, which holds conflicting stand against the hope to successfully 
implement permanent and strong corporate governance configurations. It has been 
the case that the majority of the family members are active in the decision making 
processes who are either top managers, CEOs or board members at the Turkish 
listed firms (Karaibrahimoğlu, 2013).  It is evident that framing permanent and 
strong corporate governance is an immensely challenging task and in the name of 
ultimate success, the essence of such system should be constructed upon fairness, 
transparency, accountability, and responsibility (Capital Market Boards of Turkey, 
2005).  
Family oriented structure of ownership is very common in countries like Turkey and 
the United States.  This may not be a problem in countries with strong structures of 
corporate governance, laws, protection and regulations for the rights of minority 
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shareholders.  Such nature of a market with highly populated family oriented 
structure of ownership is doomed to fail in developing countries unless a new state 
of mind is established.  
Lately in Turkey, a new generation of family oriented businesses has emerged with 
a more sustainability-focused view towards the future that concern and allocate 
more attention to corporate governance so as to survive in today’s evermore 
competitive world (Özsöz et al., 2014).  Certainly, such consciousness has been built 
due to several factors, one of which was the 2001 economic crisis of Turkey, which 
increased public interest towards corporate governance. Noteworthy reforms 
regarding corporate governance have been established in the period following the 
crisis. Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) has issued the Corporate Governance 
Principles of Turkey for all listed firms in 2003 for the purpose of recovery and 
improvement of corporate governance. These principles are robustly being 
practiced since 2005. CMB requires all listed firms to have official web pages and 
imposes them to disclose their Corporate Governance Compliance Report on that 
site. This report presents the level of non-compliance or compliance considering the 
guidelines of CMB (CMB, 2003). 
4. Conclusion 
Earnings management and corporate governance literature indicates that the 
practices of corporate governance can be effectively used as a monitoring 
mechanism to effect the reliability and consistency of financial statements by 
limiting earnings management practices. 
Good governance embraces effective monitoring and effective monitoring can be 
effected by characteristics of the board. Board size and board independency are the 
important practices of corporate governance. Smaller boards are thought as more 
effective, since they have less difficulty in monitoring, coordinating and managing 
issues (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Board independency can reduce agency problems 
and improve firm performance since it is thought as independent monitoring 
mechanism (Saleh et al., 2005). 
Since there is an increasing awareness of corporate governance practices to prevent 
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earnings management manipulation after economic crises taken place in Turkey, 
Capital Markets Board of Turkey adjusted its rules. According to Capital Markets 
Board of Turkey, the number of the board members must be at least five and the 
number of independent non-executive board members must be at least one third of 
the board and in any case there has to be two independent non-executive members 
on the board (CMB, 2003). Without successful corporate governance where there is 
lack of transparency, accountability, responsibility, and fairness, manipulative 
initiatives are expected to intensify, quality of financial statements to mislead 
drastically, while earnings management along with other accounting manipulation 
methods to escalate. 
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Chtourou, S. M., Bedard, J., and Courteau, L. (2001). Corporate Governance and 
Earnings Management, Laval University, April, 2001. 
Cormier, D., Ledoux, M. J., Magnan, M., and Aerts, W. (2010). Corporate Governance 
and Information Asymmetry between Managers and Investors. Corporate 
Governance: The international journal of business in society, 10(5), 574-589. 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., and Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades 
of Dialogue and Data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371-382. 
Dechow, P. M. and Skinner, D.J., (2000). Earnings Management: Reconciling The 
Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, And Regulators. Accounting 
Horizons 14, 235-250.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
management review, 14(1), 57-74. 
 Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 2/2 (2016) 115-127 
 
126 
 
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26, 301-325.  
Freeman, R.E (2004). “A Stakeholder Theory of Modern Corporations”, Ethical 
Theory and Business, 7th edn. 
Freeman, R. E. (2010). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Friedman, A.L. and Miles, S. (2006). “Stakeholders: Theory and Practice”, Oxford 
University Press. .  
Gonzalez, J. S. and Garcia-Meca, E. (2014). Does Corporate Governance Influence 
Earnings Management in Latin American Markets?, Journal of Business Ethics, 
2014, 121:419–440 DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1700-8  
Gulzar, M. A., and Wang, Z. (2011). Corporate Governance Characteristics and 
Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms. 
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 1(1), 133-151. 
Habbash, M. (2010). The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance and External Audit on 
Constraining Earnings Management Practice In The UK. Unpublished Doctoral 
Dissertation, Durham University, UK. 
Jensen M. and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jiraporn, P., Miller, G. A., Yoon, S., and Kim, Y.S. (2008). Is Earnings Management 
Opportunistic or Beneficial? An Agency Perspective. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 17, 622-634.  
Karacar, G. and Muştu, B. (2014). Corporate Governance in Turkey, Ethical 
Boardroom, September 2014. 
Karaibrahimoğlu, Y. Z. (2013). Is Corporate Governance A Determinant of Auditor 
Choice?-Evidence From Turkey. Ege Academic Review, 13(2). 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2000). Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of financial economics, 58(1), 3-
27. 
 Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 2/2 (2016) 115-127 
 
127 
 
OECD. (2004). OECD Countries Agree on New Corporate Governance Principles. 
Özsöz, E., Gurarda, S., and Ates, A. (2014). Ownership Structure and Corporate 
Governance in the Case of Turkey. Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 58293. 
Pergola, T. M., and Joseph, G. W. (2011). Corporate Governance and Board Equity 
Ownership. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in 
society, 11(2), 200-213. 
Rashidah, A.R., and Fairuzana, H.M.A. (2006). Board, Audit Committee, Culture and 
Earnings Management: Malaysian Evidence. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 21(7), 783-804. 
Saleh, N. M., Iskandar, T. M., and Rahmat, M. M. (2005). Earnings Management and 
Board Characteristics: Evidence from Malaysia. Jurnal Pengurusan, 24(4), 77-
103. 
Williams, J. R., Haka, S. F., Bettner, M. S., and Meigs, R. F. (2002). Financial and 
Managerial Accounting: The Basis for Business Decisions. New York, NY. 
Xie, B., Davidson, N. W., and DaDalt, P. (2003). Earnings Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Roles of the Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295-316. 
 
 
